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The eurozone is facing a complex competitiveness, fiscal, banking and political crisis.
Miguel Otero-Iglesias writes that the fundamental problem is that the countries of the
eurozone are unwilling to hand over sovereignty to an EU centre. He argues that the
significant political obstacles to reform may mean that the crisis will have to get worse in
Spain, Italy, and even Germany before European leaders will take the bold steps needed to
ensure the survival of the euro. 
“It seems that we need more trouble in the eurozone periphery bef ore we see bold
polit ical steps toward solving the crisis.” This statement by the LSE’s Waltraud Schelkle is a good
summary of  the content of  a recent LSE conf erence on the eurozone crisis that we organised at the
Centre f or International Studies. During the event, experts discussed the role of  Germany in the crisis
and the possibility of  a f iscal and polit ical union in Europe.
Generally, the consensus among the participants was that we are dealing with a complex,
multidimensional problem that can be divided into a competit iveness, f iscal, banking and polit ical crisis.
Clemens Fuest, of  the University of  Oxf ord, f or example, f ocused his attention on the competit iveness
problems of  the eurozone periphery in an increasingly globalised world. He acknowledges that there has
been a certain rebalancing between the eurozone periphery and the core since the beginning of  the
crisis, but f or him, with the exception of  Ireland, the improvements in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy
have been minor. The reductions in unit labour costs and current account def icits in these countries
appear to stem f rom high unemployment and lower wages and massive cuts in imports, rather than f rom
an improvement in productivity. Furthermore, Fuest warns that if  the current pattern of  negative growth
and relatively high interest rates in sovereign debt markets persists, several of  these countries might join
Greece in becoming insolvent.
The LSE’s Luis Garicano, on the other hand, of f ered a
comprehensive analysis of  the Spanish banking crisis. In his
opinion, a eurozone banking union is absolutely necessary
to break the diabolic f eedback loop between sovereigns and
banks. In this regard, he crit icised the recent decision by the
ministers of  f inance of  the creditor countries to exclude
legacy debt f rom the prospective banking union
arrangements. He maintains that if  the Spanish state has to
f ully guarantee the debt of  the Spanish banking system it is
unlikely to see Spain becoming attractive f or f oreign
investors because they will f ear huge tax burdens in the
f uture. As the LSE’s John Ryan pointed out during the
discussion: “where there are irresponsible debtors, there are
irresponsible lenders.” Theref ore, it seems only logical that
some of  this legacy of  debt will have to be mutualised to
share the huge adjustment costs that are taking place.
The Peterson’s Institute’s Jacob Kirkegaard explained why,
so f ar, the adjustment has been happening in the eurozone
periphery. In his opinion Germany has been quite successf ul
in using the ef f ects of  the crisis to its own advantage. Using
the ‘game of  chicken’ metaphor, he made a compelling case
that Germany, since the early stages of  the crisis, had
realised that the impact would be asymmetric. Thus, they came to the conclusion that the periphery will
blink f irst in the battle between more solidarity and more centralised control of  national budgets. The
f undamental problem is that the eurozone countries are not willing to hand in their sovereignty to the
centre. Until this is the case, the crisis will persist, and Germany will not move.
Of  course, the history of  monetary unions, the state theory of  money and the optimum currency area
(OCA) theory support Kirkegaard´s argument. A currency area can only survive if  it  has a centralised
polit ical authority to underpin it. Even Benoit Coeure, one of  the ECB’s permanent executives, has
recently accepted this logic. His words are signif icant because this is the f irst t ime that a high prof ile
policymaker at the ECB has moved away f rom the orthodox understanding of  money as a neutral medium
of  exchange and engaged with the state theory of  money.
So is the only solution to the crisis a United States of  Europe? Heribert Dieter, of  the German Institute
f or International and Security Af f airs, argues that this would be a huge mistake, which is a thought that is
increasingly shared among European scholars. European societies are too diverse and divergent to be
managed by a centralised power. In Dieter ’s opinion, the European public would be against this move,
especially the German population. This is the reason why Angela Merkel has never attempted to sell her
vision of  Europe to the German electorate. Her polit ical union idea is just too unpopular, at least f or the
moment (although, perhaps it is so unpopular precisely because she has never dared to explain it). She
might be able to push through a f ederalised or decentralised (German dominated) banking union because
this is a technical area, and it seems that this move is economically indispensable f or the survival of  the
euro, but polit ical union is a non-starter with the German public.
The question though is can the eurozone have a banking union with a resolution f und and a deposit
insurance scheme without a polit ical union? Having a single banking supervisor has major implications.
Who will determine how the ECB´s supervision needs to be executed, under which guidelines and with
what kind of  democratic legit imacy? Banking union, with all its economic and polit ical implications, might
be seen as a f iscal union through the back door. No wonder Germany is starting to have cold f eet on this
particular topic. As Waltraud Schelkle points out, since Mario Draghi came out in July 2012 with his ground
breaking speech on the irreversibility of  the euro and his determination to do whatever is required to
save the single currency, which then led to the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme,
creditor countries have slowed down progress on the banking union and debtor countries have shied
away f rom asking f or a rescue programme. It seems that we need more trouble in Spain or Italy to move
toward f urther economic and polit ical integration. Perhaps the economic situation in Germany needs to
worsen f or the German government to launch a new stimulus package like in 2009.
This shows that the eurozone is becoming the world champion in piecemeal solutions and muddling-
through. Gabriel Glöcker, f rom the ECB, laments this situation. He has argued that the markets
demanded a comprehensive ref orm package in eurozone governance. This is actually what has been
delivered but, because it has been agreed incrementally af ter long negotiations and consensus-building,
it has been much less successf ul in generating a posit ive market dynamic.
Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the progress that has been achieved. Some of  it would be
unimaginable only three years ago. The eurozone now has a permanent rescue mechanism, the ESM (a
de f acto European Monetary Fund), which has the capacity to intervene in the secondary and primary
sovereign debt markets and can also inject f unds into national banking systems. Eurozone member
states have signed the six-pack, the two-pack and the f iscal compact, which will be enshrined in
constitutional law or similar. They have also agreed to hold regular Eurogroup meetings at heads of
state and government level. In exchange, the ECB has expanded dramatically its non-conventional tool
box with the Securit ies Market Programme (SMP), the Long Term Ref inancing Operation (LTRO) scheme
and the previously mentioned Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme, which aims to strike the
right balance between solidarity, conditionality and the avoidance of  moral hazard. On top of  this, the
f our presidents (European Council, European Commission, Eurogroup and ECB) are working on a
‘genuine economic and monetary union’ f ramework and the member states are currently negotiating the
creation and implementation of  a banking union.
This is a lot of  institutional change in a relatively small amount of  t ime by European standards.
Unf ortunately, it is still not enough to solve the crisis. There are still many open questions on how to
deal with legacy debt; on what kind of  banking union will be created; on how to reignite growth; whether it
will be necessary to have a centralised eurozone budget and mutualisation of  prospective debt, and
consequently whether we will one day have the equivalent of  a eurozone minister of  f inance, with the
democratic legit imacy to shape and control national budgets.
There is no doubt that there are huge polit ical obstacles preventing these moves f rom happening, hence
perhaps the sad truth that comes out of  our discussions is that things might have to get worse bef ore
the European leaders take the bold steps that are necessary f or the euro to survive. In this regard,
Kirkegaard quotes Wolf gang Schäuble, the German Finance minister: “When things get really dif f icult…
suddenly solutions which seemed impossible become possible…Sometimes you need a litt le pressure
f or certain decisions to be taken”. It seems that we will have to wait f or this lit t le pressure.
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